Post-Cold War Nuclear Weapons and Safety Culture in South Asia:Its impact on Security of Non-Nuclear Weapon States

Abstract

Although one of the desired expectations of ending the Cold- War was the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the threat of nuclear weapon menace still persists. Additionally the ending of the Cold- War has earmarked a new set of problems to the global security sphere and simultaneously has set a new status quo to States who are involved in nuclear related activism. In such an environment, the security threat emanating from the nuclear weapon States could be seen as twofold. One is the threat emerging from the nuclear weapons developed for security purposes and the other is the risk related to the usage of nuclear material for civilian purposes. In both circumstances maintaining the 'Safety Culture' of a State is carried out by State organizations. In South Asian case, the respective nuclear doctrines of India and Pakistan describe their Nuclearizaton as a deterring result of the deep seated enmity between two countries. But the civil nuclear programmes are defined and justified as a solution for the energy demands originating from massive markets. However the security of the region depends, up to a large extent, on the mechanics of nuclear deterrence of India and Pakistan. In any case, the possibility of non-adherence to the common mechanics of deterrence by these two states may result in a large scale security destabilization of the region. Against this backdrop, there are safety impacts, on the security of Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), in South Asia who are hardly involved in any nuclear related activism as a part of their grand strategy. This paper intends to bring out the adverse third party effect of the nuclear usage of nuclear powers in South Asia