STABILITY-INSTABILITY PARADOX IN NUCLEAR SOUTH ASIA

Abstract

South Asia has its unique security characteristics, and the emerging complexities of nuclear South Asia has created an environment more difficult to be understood. India and Pakistan are two countries that possess nuclear weapons in the region. The dispute between the two communities has been prevailing for an extended period of time since the independence from the colonials and it has paved way to the separation of the two states in the end. India was the first to become a nuclear power, and shortly after Pakistan followed. These two countries are of the view that nuclear weapons contribute to balance of power therefore leads to peace and security in the region. However, according to studies, during the non-nuclear period the military provocations were less than in the nuclear period, and it has been identified the more nuclear weapons a state acquires the more destabilize the region becomes. Therefore, this research focuses on the challenges faced by non-nuclear states in South Asia due to nuclear proliferation. This complex nature has conjured security issues in the region by promoting the advancement of nuclear programs. States desire stability, and as a result of these behaviours the security of the non-nuclear states in the region is also threatened. The objective of this research is to identify how fragile deterrence works on balance of power in the South Asian region. This research has been conducted through a qualitative method, and it has used secondary sources in the data collection process.