| dc.description.abstract | Military services have over the years been far more likely to resist cooperation, and this reality has been expressed in the analysis of strategic thought. Although some critics discussed amphibious warfare and the specific linkages between naval power and land power, eminent strategists such as Clausewitz vehemently ignored naval warfare. Mahen paid only passing attention to the employment of sea power against the land power. Similarly Douhet strongly suggested that air power should be operated independently of other dimensions of war. Joint warfare is arguably a late twentieth century, if not twenty-first century phenomenon. Until the 1986 Goldwater - Nichols Act was passed in the United States inter-service harmony among the tri-services was not possible and conducting a "seamless" three-dimensional war was an uphill battle. This revolution in military affairs (RMA) significantly altered the nature of warfare brought by the innovative application of technologies. Combined with dramatic insights in military doctrine and operational concepts, such innovations have fundamentally changed the character and conduct of military operations. The phenomenon of military transformation emphasized by the Post Cold War strategists seems to revolve around four tenets. First, the operations of the three military components -- army, navy and air force - must be fully interoperable in practical and technological terms. Second, rather than the traditional military operation which was confined to a single service, the joint effort must involve contributions of two or more services. Third, the integration of service capabilities into a joint framework does enhance the friendly force battlespace awareness. Final, the battlefield mission should be assigned not according to service but according to the requirement. However, the post Cold War strategic thought has hardly addressed the impact of intercultural harmony on successful network-centric warfare operations. Critics believe that the cultural differences among the army, navy and airforce have often diluted the interoperability of the three. In particular the higher echelons of the three forces argue that the poor cultural collaboration among them during the 2009 internal war in Sri Lanka did handicap the expected levels of joint operability. This paper suggests that without reconciling the frictions among the values, beliefs and assumptions of the three forces engaged in warfare, a successful military transformation would be a forlorn hope. Also, the paper conceptualizes that the formation of a common social glue which unifies the three forces into a compatible network would be a fifth tenet for successful military transformation. The paper is four-fold. Part one is introductory and it deals with a comprehensive literature survey on military transformation. A conceptual model linking the five tenets of joint warfare will be explained in part two. Part three illustrates how the cultural harmony will enhance the jointness in practice. The final part will be devoted for concluding remarks. | en_US |
