| dc.description.abstract | Nuclear Weapons are a powerful tool in contemporary international politics, since they act as a crucial element in deciding the strategic bearings of national, regional, and global security. (De Silva, 2012) However proliferation of nuclear weapons increases the chances of a nuclear war. India and Pakistan are the two nuclear weapon states in South Asia that have deep seated enmity over Kashmir. Generally, nuclear powers with similar interest which amounts to a rivalry are considered unlikely to maintain a stable deterrence. Therefore the security of the South Asian region depends- to a considerable extent- on the matrix of nuclear deterrence of India and Pakistan. In this backdrop the possibility of non-adherence to deterrence by India or Pakistan could not be totally ruled out. A scenario of pre-emptive nuclear aggressiveness against each other may result in a worst case security destabilization of the region. One may argue that the nuclear safety of the region is loosely ensured by the vaunted international treaty mechanisms of nuclear disarmament. Furthermore the great powers have also shown a lethargic attitude in pushing India and Pakistan towards regulating their respective nuclear programs to move towards disarmament. The strategic decision making culture of India and Pakistan on Nuclear issues have differences which are poles apart. However India and Pakistan have managed to overcome their inherent problems of nuclear programmes and to avoid the risk of confrontation so far. There are four factors that influence the balance matrix of Indo- Pakistan nuclear relationship. They are the civil military decision making process, the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), events taking place which could lead to pre-emptive nuclear aggression and nuclear programme verification. The civil - military cooperation of both countries stands as a common element in the above mentioned factors. This paper intends to look at the Civil- Military cooperation as a significant element of nuclear stability in South Asia during the absence of several other stabilising factors mentioned above. As Scott Sagan argues ?organizational proclivities in South Asia could be effectively controlled by tight and sustainable civilian control over military?.( Sagan, 2012) This paper further tries to understand the complex issues of civil- military cooperation in India and Pakistan within and between states (vertically and horizontally) in order to ensure nuclear stability in the region. | en_US |
